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RIVER OF DISCONTENT:
ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Brian Spiegel*
I. INTRODUCTION
OR decades the neighboring South American countries of Argen-
tina and Uruguay enjoyed a peaceful and economically beneficial
relationship. But that changed beginning in 2003 when Uruguay
announced its decision to allow Spanish company ENCE/CMB to con-
struct a pulp mill on its side of the River Uruguay - the natural boundary
between the two countries. The claimed unilateral decision by Uruguay
immediately troubled Argentina and its citizens, who feared that the pulp
mill would pollute the area and cause problems to some of Argentina's
most important economic resources, such as fishing and tourism. Uru-
guay's decision months later to allow for the construction of the Swedish-
developed Botnia mill in the same area - also allegedly unilateral - sent
Argentina into an uproar.
Argentina claimed that Uruguay violated the 1975 Statute of the River
Uruguay (1975 Statute) while Uruguay countered that the country had
followed all the steps required by the 1975 Statute.' After failing to reach
an agreement amicably, Argentina, pursuant to the 1975 Statute, initiated
proceedings with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 2 Meanwhile,
the citizens of Gualeguaychti, an Argentine town twenty-five kilometers
west of the construction sites, began blockading bridges that connect Ar-
gentina and Uruguay in hopes that the construction would be unable to
continue. When the Argentine government did little to stop the block-
ades, Uruguay initiated its own proceedings with the ICJ pursuant to the
1975 Statute.
This paper begins by detailing the 1975 Statute and how it applies to
the contentious dispute between the two countries. It will then focus on
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1. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Order of July 13, 2006), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/11235.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2008)
[hereinafter July Order].
2. Id.; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Application) (May 4, 2006), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/10779.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2008) [here-
inafter Argentina Application].
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the significance of the countries' actions in relation to their geographic
location and economic relationship. Next, this paper discusses the cur-
rent litigation before the ICJ, from the initial application by Argentina to
the possible outcome, which is not expected until at least 2009. It will
then change sides and look at the confrontation from the Uruguayan per-
spective, again beginning with the country's claims and ending with the its
request for provisional measures. Finally, this paper will ask, and hope-
fully answer, whether the relationship between Argentina and Uruguay
can possibly be salvaged, how the potential outcome of the ICJ proceed-
ings will affect both countries, and whether new Argentina president
Christina Kirchner offers hope for the future.
II. 1975 STATUTE
On February 26, 1975, Argentina and Uruguay signed the Statute of
the River Uruguay "in order to establish the joint machinery necessary
for the optimum and rational utilization of the River Uruguay. ''3 Be-
cause the two countries are within such close proximity to one another,
and separated only by the River, it would not be difficult for one coun-
try's decision concerning use of the river to have an impact on the other.
Thus, the purpose of the 1975 Statute was to prevent either of the two
countries from unilaterally making a decision that could adversely affect
the other country or the quality of the river.4
The 1975 Statute created the Administrative Commission of the River
Uruguay (CARU), an administrative commission made up of an equal
number of representatives from each country. 5 CARU governs every-
thing "from maintenance of the bridges that span" the river to conserva-
tion of fishing resources to environmental questions. 6 Once CARU is
notified by the acting country of its plans, consultations are deemed to
have begun between that country and the notified country. 7 In most situ-
ations the notified party will not raise a concern and the acting country
can continue with the project.8 But if the notified party has an objection,
the 1975 Statute calls for 180 days of direct negotiations between the two
countries. 9 If after 180 days no agreement can be reached between the
countries either party may proceed before the ICJ. 10 A major source of
Argentina's anger stems from its belief that Uruguay disregarded the ob-
3. Statute of the River Uruguay, Uru.-Arg., Feb. 26, 1975, 1295 U.N.T.S. 340 [herein-
after 1975 Statute].
4. Id.
5. Id. at 341, art. 7. Article 7 obligates a party to notify the Commission if the country
"plans to construct new channels, substantially modify or alter existing ones or carry
out any other works which are liable to affect navigation, the regime of the river or
the quality of its waters." Id. (emphasis added).




9. Id.; 1975 Statute, supra note 3 at 341, arts. 8, 11.
10. 1975 Statute, supra note 3, at 340-41, art. 7, 11.
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ligatory notification process, a belief Uruguay refutes.1 1
III. ECONOMIC AND GEOGRAPHIC SIGNIFICANCE
Brought into focus by the pulp mill dispute is the eastern portion of
Argentina and western portion of Uruguay, with the main area under the
microscope being the twenty-five to thirty-five kilometers the River Uru-
guay covers. The city of Gualeguaychti, Entre Rfos is located near the
international Libertador General San Martfn Bridge approximately
thirty-five kilometers west of the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos, the lo-
cation of the Botnia pulp mill and the proposed location of the ENCE
mill. Separating Gualeguaychti and Fray Bentos is the River Uruguay,
and it is common to find citizens of either country employed in the other.
Moreover, it is common for tourists to visit either country and commute
between the two by way of the connecting bridges.
Argentina's concerns are twofold and relate to the geographic location
of Fray Bentos: a concern for the quality of the river, a natural resource
relied on by fishermen and citizens of their country, and a concern for the
potential economic impact on tourism in the Entre Rfos region. But
whether the 1975 Statute covers both of these concerns has been an issue
argued during litigation. Uruguay has claimed that the 1975 Statute only
covers the direct effect of the pulp mill, mainly potential water
pollution.12
While the potential economic and environmental damage done to Ar-
gentina may turn out to be huge, Uruguay stands to benefit significantly
from the pulp mills. When the announcement was made that there would
be two mills constructed in Uruguay it represented the largest foreign
investment in the history of the country. 13 The effect was felt immedi-
ately as the Uruguayan citizens began to benefit from the thousands of
jobs created by the construction of the mills.14 Additionally, it was
claimed that the economic impact of the mills in Uruguay would result in
an increase of 2 percent of the country's gross domestic product.1 5 It is
not difficult to see why both countries care so much about the outcome of
the dispute.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
A. THE APPLICATION PROCESS
Only two types of cases come before the ICJ: contentious cases, like
the one between Argentina and Uruguay, and advisory proceedings.16
11. July Order, supra note 1, at 2, 10; Argentina Application, supra, note 2.
12. July Order, supra note 1, at 10.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id.
15. Id. It is estimated the mill could have an economic impact of $350 million annu-
ally. Id.
16. Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. art. 9, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
documents/index.php?pl=4&p2=3&p3=0 [hereinafter Rules of Court].
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Contentious cases are legal disputes brought only by states that are mem-
bers of the United Nations while advisory proceedings are answers to
legal questions before the Court. In order for the ICJ to control a given
case, both states have to agree to the Court's jurisdiction through either a
special agreement between the countries, a jurisdictional clause found in
a statute, a treaty that calls for the Court's involvement upon a dispute
between the two countries, or a declaration made by both countries. 17
The ICJ has jurisdiction over a dispute between Argentina and Uruguay
by way of the 1975 Statute. Specifically, article 60 of the Statute allows
for "[a]ny dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the...
1975 Statute which cannot be settled by direct negotiations [to] be sub-
mitted by either party to the [ICJ].' 18
Once jurisdiction is established, the Court requires a detailed applica-
tion in order to institute proceedings. The application must state how the
Court has jurisdiction - by way of treaty or declaration - over the facts of
the dispute, and the requested outcome. Upon receipt of the application,
the case is deemed opened, at which point both parties are required to
exchange written arguments, or pleadings, with the other party that con-
tains the facts and law each party will rely on. 19 Finally, the parties argue
orally in a public setting, after which the Court retires until it is ready to
announce its decision.20 But the typical procedure is subject to excep-
tions, including a country's request for provisional measures, an occur-
rence common and important in the dispute over the pulp mills.
B. REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES
A decision by the ICJ can take years, at which time any harm caused by
one of the countries could be irrevocable. To combat this problem the
ICJ allows for the applicant state to submit a request for provisional mea-
sures if the state feels "that the rights which form the subject of its appli-
cation are in immediate danger. '21 But the Court's power to implement
provisional measures is especially stringent, able to approve a request for
provisional measures only "if there is an urgent need to prevent irrepara-
ble prejudice to the rights that are the subject of the dispute before the
Court has had an opportunity to render its decision. '22
While a request for provisional measures can be made at any time, it is
customary (and some would say strategic) for the request to be submitted
with the original application. 23 According to commentators, because pro-
17. Id.
18. July Order, supra note 1, at 2.
19. Rules of Court, supra note 16, arts. 46, 49.
20. Id., arts. 53-72.
21. Int'l Ct. Justice, How the Court Works, http://www.icj-cij.orglcourt/index.php?pl=
l&p2=6.
22. July Order, supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis added).
23. Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, The Settlement of International Disputes: The Contribu-
tion of Australia and New Zealand 153 (Springer) (1998) [hereinafter Interna-
tional Disputes].
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visional measures will only be granted in the most dire of circumstances,
applicant states feel that their best chance of having their request granted
is to submit their request with their application in order to show the ex-
treme nature and urgency of the problem. 24 Requests for provisional
measures are also unique in that the Court does not need to reach a final
decision on whether they have jurisdiction to hear the dispute.25 Instead,
the Court need only determine that there is prima facie evidence that it
has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case.26 Finally, a state that
was denied provisional measures is not prevented from submitting future
requests for provisional measures as long as that state feels relevant
changes have been made since the Court denied its request.27
V. ARGENTINA'S APPLICATION AND REQUEST FOR
PROVISIONAL MEASURES
A. INITIAL RESPONSE: 2002-2003
In 2002, Argentina began to hear rumors that Uruguay had authorized
the Spanish company ENCE to begin construction of a pulp mill near
Fray Bentos. According to Argentina, it immediately requested informa-
tion from Uruguay regarding the project, even though official confirma-
tion of the construction had not been given.28 Argentina, concerned with
the potential environmental impact of the mill, wanted Uruguay to pro-
vide an environmental impact study disclosing whether the mill would
prove harmful in Argentine territory.29 Although refuted by Uruguay,
Argentina stated that Uruguay's delegates within CARU disregarded the
requests. 30
In the second week of October 2003,31 Uruguay officially announced
that it had authorized ENCE to construct the CMB pulp mill near Fray
Bentos. 32 A week later Argentina called an extraordinary session of
CARU to request information regarding the project and implement the
required consultation period.33 When Argentina alleged that Uruguay
was intentionally avoiding the matter, Argentine Foreign Minister Jorge
Taiana told the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies
that "this has become a controversy at the [national] government level
24. Id. at 151-154.
25. Id.; July Order, supra note 1, at 15.
26. July Order, supra note 1, at 15.
27. Rules of Court, supra note 16, art. 73; July Order, supra note 1 at 20; International
Disputes, supra note 23.
28. Malamud, supra note 6, % 13.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The parties dispute the official date of announcement.
32. July Order, supra note 1, at 2; Argentina Application, supra note 2.
33. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Req. for Provisional Measures, Oral Hearings)
(June 9, 2006) 14-15, available at http://hei.unige.ch/-kohen/pleadings/cau-cr-
2006 48 20060609_translation.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Argen-
tina's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request]
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over the implementation and interpretation of the Statute. '34
B. THE ATTEMPT TO COMPROMISE AND THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT
On March 2, 2004, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs for both Argentina
and Uruguay met in Buenos Aires with hopes of settling the dispute that
had then reached over a year in length.35 The date of the meeting is
essentially all that the two countries now agree on, with Uruguay claim-
ing that an agreement was reached between the two countries 36 and Ar-
gentina vehemently denying that such an agreement was reached.37 In its
first round of oral hearings Uruguay stated to the Court that the two
ministers had agreed on three things: (1) "[T]he CMB mill could be built
according to Uruguayan plan"; (2) Argentina would be provided "with
information regarding [the] specifications and operation" of the mill; and
(3) once the mill became operational, CARU would monitor the quality
of the water "in order to ensure compliance with the Statute. ' 38 Further-
more, Uruguay claimed that the agreement discussed above was to be
extended to the building of the second mill, the Botnia mill. 39
Argentina refuted Uruguay's claims when they spoke in front of the
ICJ during the oral hearings. According to Argentina, the meeting "was
nothing more or less than a meeting held in Buenos Aires by Ministers
Bielsa and Opertti in which Argentina once again expressed its willing-
ness to settle the dispute on the basis of compliance with the 1975 Stat-
ute."'40 While Uruguay claimed that Argentina gave it permission during
the March 2 meeting to construct the CMB mill according to its desires,
Argentina asked in oral hearings why this alleged agreement was not put
in writing.41 In fact, even the Uruguayan delegate to CARU admitted to
only hearing about the agreement and never seeing a "protocol. '42
Argentina attempted to show the lack of knowledge the country had
regarding the project as proof that no agreement existed. During the oral
hearings Argentina asked the ICJ how it would be possible for the For-
eign Minister to have given permission to Uruguay to continue the pro-
ject when the country still had not received any of the information
concerning the CMB mill that it had requested. 43 Finally, as further
proof that no agreement had been reached on March 2, Argentina
pointed to the fact that it continued to ask Uruguay to abide by section 7
of the 1975 Statute even after the attempted settlement negotiations took
place, asking the Court rhetorically "[w]hy if Argentina had given such
34. Malamud, supra note 6, 14.
35. July Order, supra note 1, at 11.
36. Id.; See Marcela Valente, Argentina-Uruguay: Pulp Mill Agreement Eases Tensions,
Not Residents' Fears, IPS, Jul. 25, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=29632.
37. Argentina's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 33, at 18.
38. July Order, supra note 1, at 11.
39. Id.





consent, did it continue to urge Uruguay to comply with Article 7?"1144
C. THE APPLICATION: ARGENTINA'S CLAIMS
On May 4, 2006, Argentina initiated proceedings by filing an applica-
tion with the ICJ and a request for provisional measures. 45 Argentina
claimed that Uruguay had violated the 1975 Statute in a number of ways
stemming from its unilateral authorization of the construction of two pulp
mills on the River Uruguay by two separate European corporations. Ar-
gentina first complained that Uruguay had disregarded the 1975 Statute
by failing to notify and consult through CARU.46 Because the construc-
tion of the mills was liable to affect the waters, Argentina said that Uru-
guay had no choice but to follow the steps laid out in the 1975 Statute,
which included the obligatory notification of CARU.47 Argentina
claimed that even after continued protests to both CARU and the Uru-
guayan government concerning "the environmental impact of the pro-
posed mill," Uruguay not only disregarded its complaints but made the
situation worse, "aggravat[ing] the dispute" by authorizing the construc-
tion of the Botnia plant in February 2005.48
Argentina also expressed outrage over Uruguay's lack of consideration
for the environment, pointing in its application to the environmental
studies done for each of the mills. 49 The National Directorate for the
Environment of the Uruguayan Government (DINAMA) labeled the
two projects near the River Uruguay "as projects presenting a risk of
major negative environmental impact."'50 Specifically, DINAMA pointed
to the aquatic life and the dangers presented to one of Argentina's most
important resources: fishing. In its report, DINAMA stated that "the
process envisioned by [both] projects . . . is inherently polluting" and if
looking solely at the area of the river that would likely be affected by the
mills, "90 per cent of fish production" is located there - "over 4,500 ton-
nes per year," as well as a major area for migratory breeding. 5' Argen-
tina also had serious concerns with the amount of effluent expected to be
released into the River Uruguay, the mill's distance from major cities,
and "the inadequacy of the measures proposed for the prevention and
reduction of the potential impact of liquid effluent, gas emissions and
solid waste."'52
In its application Argentina asked for a number of declarations from
the Court, including a finding that Uruguay engaged in wrongful conduct,
that Uruguay must make amends for the injuries caused by Uruguay, and
44. Id.
45. Argentina Application, supra note 2.
46. July Order, supra note 1, at 2.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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that Uruguay breached a number of its obligations, ranging from the noti-
fication process of the 1975 Statute to the protecting of the wildlife and
natural resources. 53 Uruguay refutes all of the charges brought against
them and states that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction over some of the
claims brought by Argentina. 54
D. ARGENTINA'S REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES
With no decision expected for at least three years from the time the
application was submitted, Argentina requested, along with its applica-
tion, that the ICJ grant immediate provisional measures. The tone of the
request was similar to the application, noting both procedural and sub-
stantive issues. At the outset, the debate between the countries centered
on what the ICJ could rule on.
1. Jurisdiction
Neither Argentina nor Uruguay disputed the fact that the ICJ had ju-
risdiction over the part of the dispute governed by the 1975 Statute. But
Argentina believed that the 1975 Statute governed not only the direct
impact the mills might have on the environment and natural resources
but also covered the "obligations of the parties regarding the prevention
of pollution and the liability resulting from damage inflicted as a result of
pollution. '55 In sum, Argentina believed that the 1975 Statute would
cover any economic damage done to Argentina by way of the mill's pollu-
tion, including tourism.
Uruguay countered that the 1975 Statute, and therefore the ICJ's juris-
diction, does not cover "dispute[s] relating to the possible effects of the
mills other than those relating to any impairment of the quality of the
river waters, or . . . those stemming directly from such impairment by
cause and effect." 56 Uruguay expressly stated that the Court's jurisdic-
tion does not cover the mill's impact on tourism unless the effect flowed
directly from the alleged pollution of the water.57 On the second day of
oral hearings, Argentina responded to Uruguay's jurisdictional claim by
pointing to Article 4258 of the 1975 Statute and "established international
principles" and stating that the 1975 Statute did cover "economic and
social consequences of the mills."' 59 In its decision regarding Argentina's
request for provisional measures, the Court found that the dispute over
what the 1975 Statute covered was inconsequential to its ruling.60 In an-
53. July Order, supra note 1, at 3-4.
54. Id. at 10.
55. July Order, supra note 1, at 2.
56. Id. at 10.
57. Id.
58. Article 42 states that "[elach Party shall be liable to the other for damages inflicted
as a result of pollution caused by its own activities or by those carried out in its
territory by individuals or legal entities." 1975 Statute, supra note 3, at 342, art. 42.
59. July Order, supra note 1, at 13.
60. Id. at 15.
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nouncing its judgment the Court stated that it only needed prima facie
evidence that the Court would have jurisdiction, and it could withhold
answering the more difficult questions until it ruled on the merits.61
2. Argentina's Specific Request
It is difficult to tell what bothered Argentina most regarding Uruguay's
decisions, the lack of respect they felt Uruguay showed by disregarding
the 1975 Statute, or the concerns for the country's economic well being.
Regardless, the request for provisional measures included charges related
to both. As discussed, in order for a country to have its request for provi-
sional measures granted, a showing of urgency is needed. Argentina's
request is filled with words such as "irreparable," "irreversible," and "in-
evitable" - words attempting to show the Court that if action is not taken
immediately, harm will be done that cannot be repaired. Argentina
noted in its request that the Court would need to find "a serious risk that
irreparable prejudice or damage might occur."'62
Argentina's request for provisional measures centers around the
charge that Uruguay should never have begun construction in the first
place. Now that Uruguay had begun construction, Argentina believed it
needed to stop at least until proper environmental measures can be
taken. Argentina stated both procedural and substantive obligations that
caused such severe damage provisional measures were necessary, and
pointed to the 1975 Statute for both. Article 4163 - laid out in the chapter
on pollution - stated the substantive rights, while the procedural obliga-
tions stem from much of what has already been discussed, mainly the lack
of notification. 64
Argentina claimed at least two rights from the substantive obligations
owed to the country were disregarded by Uruguay. First, Argentina was
owed "the right that Uruguay shall prevent pollution. '65 Second, Argen-
tina stated Uruguay had a duty to follow international standards. 66 In-
cluded in this substantive obligation under the 1975 Statute was
"Uruguay's obligation not to cause environmental pollution or conse-
quential economic losses, for example to tourism. '67
Procedurally, Argentina stressed that the construction of the mills
should never have begun in the first place, but just because construction
61. Id.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Article 41(a) states that both parties to the 1975 Statute agreed "[t]o protect and
preserve the aquatic environment and, in particular, to prevent its pollution, by
prescribing appropriate rules and measures in accordance with applicable interna-
tional agreements and in keeping, where relevant, with the guidelines and recom-
mendations of international technical bodies." 1975 Statute, supra note 3, at 342,
art. 41(a).
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began does not mean that it cannot be ended.68 The specific rights
claimed procedurally through the Statute are those we have seen before:
Argentina had a right to be notified prior to Uruguay beginning construc-
tion, the views of Argentina must be considered by Uruguay, and the
Court must resolve any differences before construction is to begin.69 In
sum, according to Argentina, and incredibly important to the request for
provisional measures as stated by the Court, article 970 "established a 'no
construction' obligation .... ,71
But what makes the request for provisional measures different than a
decision on the merits is the sense of urgency and need for immediate
action. In the first round of oral hearings, Argentina stated that its rights
from the substantive and procedural obligations discussed above "were
under immediate threat of serious and irreparable prejudice. '72 Pointing
to the economic activities in the Entre Rios region and the effects of the
mills, Argentina claimed that the mills' construction was already taking
its toll on tourism and property values.73
Perhaps realizing that the mills' effects on tourism and economic activi-
ties, if found to be unlawful, could be fixed years later with monetary
payments from Uruguay, Argentina directed the Court towards the fast-
paced nature of the construction process and argued that once the Court
ruled the mills would be complete. Looking specifically at the substan-
tive rights claimed, Argentina stated that once the mills were built, dis-
mantling them would not "restore" the right the country has to a
protected river.74 Procedurally, Argentina argued that once the mills
were complete "there would 'no longer be any obligation to be dis-
charged."' 75 It is easy to see the argument Argentina was trying to make:
what is the point of the 1975 Statute if one country can violate it and
essentially be protected by the lengthy ICJ procedural process?
Because the Botnia mill was expected to be completed in August 2007
and the CMB mill completed in June 2008, the decision from the ICJ
would come after both plants were completed. In this type of situation
Argentina believed that the definition of "urgency" as required for provi-
sional measures was different. 76 The country argued before the ICJ that
in a situation such as the one here - where the damage cited has a chance
of occurring before the Court's decision on the merits - the term "ur-
gency broadly merges with the condition [of the] existence of a serious
68. Id.
69. July Order, supra note 1, at 8.
70. Article 9 states that "[i]f the notified Party raises no objections or does not re-
spond within the period established in article 8, the other Party may carry out or
authorize the work planned." 1975 Statute, supra note 3, at 341, art. 9.
71. July Order, supra note 1, at 8.
72. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 9
75. Id.
76. July Order, supra note 1, at 9.
RIVER OF DISCONTENT
risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights in issue."'77 Argentina's final
argument before the Court during the first round of oral hearings was
that these conditions were met and the construction of the mills was "ad-
vancing at a rapid rate."'78
3. Uruguay's Response
As can be expected, Uruguay denied each claim made by Argentina.
The issue of jurisdiction has already been discussed but should be under-
scored once more, if for nothing more than an understanding of how the
case may come out on the merits. Uruguay's initial argument before the
Court was that in addition to the effects on tourism, the 1975 Statute does
not cover the effects on property values, unemployment levels (the im-
portance of fishing), and other professional activities. 79
After making its jurisdictional argument, Uruguay began arguing the
basis of Argentina's claims. In front of the Court Uruguay used its time
to explain that the environmental impact studies and "strict licensing con-
ditions imposed by Uruguayan law" made it nearly impossible for any
harm to be caused to Argentina and the River Uruguay. 0
Uruguay first pointed to the Hatfield Report, a report prepared for the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), which Argentina once used to
bolster its claims. Argentina also attempted to use the Hatfield Report
during oral hearings to show that Uruguay had not acted in accordance
with the procedural obligations imposed by the 1975 Statute. 1 When
Uruguay's turn came in front of the ICJ the country pointed to the con-
clusions reached by the Hatfield consultants. 82 The independent report
stated that "[c]omments expressing concern that the mills will cause cata-
strophic environmental damage are unsupported, unreasonable and ig-
nore the experience in many other modern bleached kraft pulp mills." '83
Additionally, the IFC commissioned a 221-page, extensive cumulative
impact study (CIS) before deciding to lend money for the construction of
the facilities. The CIS was incredibly favorable to Uruguay and included
many important conclusions, two of which are specifically relevant. First,
as to the pulp mill's effect on tourism in Argentina, the CIS reported that
any odors emanating from the plants will have no effect on tourism.84
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 12.
80. Id. at 11; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Request for Provisional Measures,
Oral Hearings) (June 8, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/
13128.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Uruguay's First Round of Oral
Hearings for May Request].
81. Argentina's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 33, at 42.
82. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80, at 18.
83. Id.
84. Cumulative Impact Study, International Finance Corporation, available at http://
www.ifc.org/ifcext/lac.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/UruguayCISOct2006/$FILE/Uru-
guayCIS Oct2006.pdf, at 34 [hereinafter CIS]. The report stated that "visitors to
the Las Cafias region beach resort in Rio Negro and to Nandubaysal beach resort
2008]
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But the construction of the mills will be anything but aesthetically pleas-
ing, and the report admitted that the mills will be seen as tourists cross
over the International Bridge; however, it included many examples of
tourism and pulp mills co-existing while stating its belief that the visuals
will not pose harm.85 Second, the report stated that water quality should
not be an issue due to the size of the River Uruguay. 86 Because of the
river depth the effluent will be diluted by the water in all relevant places
and, according to the report, should not cause problems to the citizens or
aquatic life.87 After discussing the CIS, Professor Alan Boyle stated that
"[nione of the assessments ...by the IFC has provided objective evi-
dence that would meet even this threshold of potential harm, let alone
one focused on irreparable damage. ' '88
Uruguay stated during oral hearings that its first priority is the mainte-
nance and preservation of the environment as well as the health of the
citizens of both Argentina and Uruguay.89 The country stressed that pro-
tecting the environment was a constitutional duty.9° To make sure that
duty was performed, Uruguayan law created the Direccion Nacional de
Medio Ambiente (DINAMA), an environmental agency to monitor con-
struction projects that could potentially harm the environment. 91 Before
construction began on both plants and during the actual construction pro-
cess, DINAMA required - as they do of all industrial projects - that the
applicants meet a number of requirements: (1) the applicant must have
an environmental impact study done and approved by DINAMA before
construction can begin; (2) related to requirement one, no approval will
be given by DINAMA to the applicant if the agency finds that the indus-
trial facility will result in unacceptable harm to water quality, water re-
sources, or the environment; (3) after construction but before operation
the plant operator must obtain from DINAMA further approval, at which
time the agency can require adjustments never before mentioned during
the process; and (4) once the industrial facility is operational DINAMA
will continue to monitor the environmental impact and must re-approve
the facility every three years "in order to ensure [its] operating proce-
dures [are] state of the art and provide the highest standard of environ-
mental protection. '92
Uruguay argued that the Court must look at Argentina's request for
provisional measures in the context of the DINAMA approval process.
in Gualeguaychti will not experience air quality, odour or water pollution impacts
as a result of the pulp mills ..... Id.
85. Id. According to the CIS "[t]he change to the landscape is permanent, however the
public's response to these new industrial features is subjective and may evolve over
time." Id.
86. Id. at 147.
87. Id. at 147-48.
88. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80, at 24.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.; July Order, supra note 1, at 12.
92. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80; See gen-
erally DINAMA homepage, http://www.dinama.gub.uy/.
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At oral hearings, Uruguay's arguments mainly centered on the claim that
for provisional measures to be ordered there must be current irreparable
harm being done.93 Therefore, Uruguay argued that the Court can only
look at the harm (if any) currently being done by the construction process
since harm done once the facilities were operational could be taken care
of at a later time and by way of another request by Argentina.94 Further,
and relating to DINAMA, Uruguay noted that the agency would have to
approve both plants before operations were to begin and the agency was
currently monitoring the quality of the water during the construction pro-
cess and had not found any problems as a result of the construction pro-
cess. 95 As stated by Professor Boyle during oral hearings, "Argentina is
in no position today to demonstrate an immediate and grave risk of irrep-
arable harm due to pollution or the risk of pollution from plants whose
completion and operation is far from imminent. '96
While Uruguay asserts that no violations to any of Argentina's rights
have occurred, it certainly does not feel any harm has been done that
warrants provisional measures. The 1975 Statute expressly allows for Ar-
gentina and/or Uruguay to use the River Uruguay for industrial pur-
poses. 97 Describing Argentina's substantive right as one that consists of
the right to "hold Uruguay to its obligation not to allow the cellulose
plants that are now under construction to contaminate the river in viola-
tion of the Statute and the regulations promulgated by the Commission,"
Uruguay attempted to show how it was impossible that any urgent, irrep-
arable harm was taking place. 98
Uruguay again pointed to the long list of requirements that must be
met in order for the plants to become operational, including its own coun-
try's requirements concerning the water quality.99 It then hypothetically
asked the Court how it would be possible for Argentina's right to have
been violated before answering it would not be possible unless the plants
were operational. 10 0 This point was one which Uruguay relied on heavily
during oral hearings and once again stresses the importance of urgency
and the limiting circumstances in which provisional measures will be or-
dered. It also provides a glimpse at why Argentina stressed during oral
93. See July Order, supra note 1; Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May
Request, supra note 80.
94. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 22.
97. 1975 Statute, supra note 3, art. 27. Article 27 states that "[tihe right of each Party
to use the waters of the river, within its jurisdiction, for domestic, sanitary, indus-
trial and agricultural purposes shall be exercised without prejudice to the applica-
tion of the procedure laid down in article 7 to 12 when the use is liable to affect the
regime of the river or the quality of its waters." Id. (emphasis added).
98. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80.
99. Id.
100. Id. Uruguay's exact answer to the hypothetical question posed above regarding
when potential harm could occur was that "[t]his could occur - if at all - only after
the plants start operating. It could not occur - not even hypothetically -while the
plants are still under construction, as they are now, because during construction
they are not discharging chemicals of any kind into the river." Id. at 45-46
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hearings that urgency should be looked at differently in this situation.
Argentina admits that no substantive harm has been done by the con-
struction of the pulp mills and, as Uruguay states, if this was not true
Argentina surely would have included such information in its applica-
tion. I 10 Argentina feels that urgency in this situation should be looked at
in the context of when a potential decision will be reached on the merits
by the Court. By then, Argentina claims, both mills would be opera-
tional. Therefore, according to Argentina, urgency in this context should
be determined by taking into consideration when the plants will become
operational and when a possible decision will be announced by the ICJ.
To support its position that preparatory action in and of itself is not an
offense, Uruguay pointed to a previous case before the ICJ involving
Hungary and Slovakia. In a somewhat similar fact pattern, the Court
stated:
A wrongful act or offence is frequently preceded by preparatory ac-
tions which are not to be confused with the act or offence itself. It is
as well to distinguish between the actual commission of a wrongful
act (whether instantaneous or continuous) and the conduct prior to
that act which is of a preparatory character and which 'does not qual-
ify as a wrongful act. ' 10 2
Applying the ICJ's ruling above, the wrongful act would be the con-
tamination of the River Uruguay while the preparatory action would be
the construction of the pulp mills. While the Hungarian/Slovakian dis-
pute did not involve a request for provisional measures, the Court's opin-
ion is helpful. In addition to differentiating between a wrongful act and
the events leading up to that act, the same Court discussed its definition
of imminence, an important term in deciding a request for provisional
measures. "Imminence," the Court said, "is synonymous with 'immedi-
acy' or 'proximity' and goes far beyond the concept of 'possibility."' "103
Based on this definition it is not difficult to understand Uruguay's ten-
dency to point out previous environmental studies in hopes of proving to
the Court no environmental damage is likely.
After discussing the requirement of urgency, Uruguay next discussed
the requirement of irreparability. While much of the oral hearings con-
cerning irreparable harm consisted of Uruguay giving specific examples
of members of Argentina's political cabinet specifically saying no irrepa-
rable harm will occur as a result of the pulp mills, Uruguay began its
argument by mentioning the high quality of the mills. Although the qual-
ity of the mills does not seem to be aligned entirely with irreparable
101. Id.; See Argentina Application, supra note 2. Paragraph 22 of Argentina's applica-
tion states "in conclusion, in spite of the non-compliance by Uruguay of the proce-
dures set forth by the 1975 Statute, the information available to Argentina clearly
establishes that the placing in service of the CMB and Orion pulp mills will
cause .. " Id. (emphasis added).




harm, Uruguay made an effort whenever possible to show the Court how
advanced the two mills were going to be.' 0 4
Paul Reichler of Washington D.C. law firm Foley Hoag began his argu-
ment by stating that "this case is not about a [s]tate that is exploding
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere" but instead about a country building
two pulp mills that will meet the standards of countries in Europe.10 5 The
fact that the pulp mills were expected to meet European requirements is
important: according to a World Economic Forum study the European
countries of Finland and Norway rank first and second respectively in
protecting the environment.10 6 In fact, according to the same study, no
country in the Western Hemisphere protects the environment better than
Uruguay.107
But it is questionable what this information means in relation to caus-
ing irreparable harm. Instead of showing how the Uruguayan plants,
when operational, will perform to the highest European standards, it
would have been more helpful to know whether industrial facilities in
Finland, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom have ever caused
harm to the environment that was not curable. This is what the require-
ment of irreparable harm means in the context of provisional measures.
There is no doubt Uruguay is concerned about environmental protection,
but this does not guarantee that the rights of Argentina will end up un-
harmed, even with Uruguay meeting the Best Available Techniques
(BAT) and following the 1999 recommendations of the European
Union.1 08
Uruguay's argument concerning irreparable harm picked up force
when Reicher pointed to specific examples of prominent Argentine poli-
ticians stating the lack of irreparable harm. Uruguay first pointed to a
statement made on behalf of Argentina by Dr. Armando Garin, Argen-
tina's official member of the CARU. Garin stated to the CARU that "[i]t
must be pointed out, with complete and absolute emphasis that none of
the different technical reports evidence that the activity in question
causes an irreversible and unavoidable damage to the environ-
ment . ,,.o9 Garin went on to state that at the very least there was no
reason to end construction of the two plants.
Then Garin made an interesting remark, stating that the process must
go forward based on the scientific evidence available and the agreement
104. See generally Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra
note 80; July Order, supra note 1.
105. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80, at 53
(emphasis original).
106. See World Economic Forum, available at http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi.;
Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80.
107. See World Economic Forum, supra note 106; Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hear-
ings for May Request, supra note 80.
108. See European Commission, Guidance on Interpretation and Implementation of
the IPPC Directive, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pollutants/sta-
tionary/ippc/general-guidance.htm.
109. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80, at 55.
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reached by the Foreign Ministers.10 The agreement mentioned was in-
deed the attempt to compromise that took place in 2004, one Argentina
states never happened."' It is interesting to note that in Argentina's first
round of hearings it failed to mention any agreement being reached in
2004, instead referring to the discussions as nothing more than Uruguay
agreeing to provide Argentina with information concerning the plants. 112
In fact, in Uruguay's response it quoted then Argentine President Nestor
Kirchner referring to the March 2004 discussions as a bilateral
agreement.13
Before moving on, Uruguay attacked the fact that Argentina had ten
operational industrial facilities, including one that discharged effluents
into the Panama River, the river bordering Argentina and Panama. Uru-
guay stated, almost mockingly, that an "environmentally responsible
Government" such as Argentina would not allow the discharge of the
aforementioned effluents if it would cause irreparable harm or damage to
Panama.1 4 Reicher went on to state that because Argentina continued
to operate a plant that is clearly inferior with regards to environmental
friendliness, and the country would not operate a plant that caused such
grave damage, that must mean that Uruguay's plants cannot logically
cause irreparable harm to Argentina." 15
Uruguay did, however, believe irreparable harm could be done; it just
thought that such harm would be done to its country if the ICJ ruled in
favor of Argentina. The final argument Uruguay made in the first round
of oral hearings relied on its proclaimed sovereign right to sustain an "ec-
onomic development project in its own territory that does not violate
Uruguay's obligations under the statute... or [under] CARU." 116 While
Uruguay admitted this right would be given serious weight when the
Court reached a decision on the merits, it believed a granting of provi-
sional measures would consequently disregard that right and make the
decision on the merits meaningless. 17 The country felt this way because
of what it believed would happen if construction of the mills was sus-
110. Id.
111. See Argentina's Application, supra note 2; July Order, supra note 1; Id.
112. See July Order, supra note 1, at 11; Argentina's First Round of Oral Hearings for
May Request, supra note 33, at 18
113. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80, at 55.
Kirchner is quoted as stating that the meeting was "a bilateral agreement which
put an end to the controversy over the cellulose plant installation in Fray Bentos."
Id. Kirchner went on to say that the 2004 agreement respected the importance of
the project to Uruguay as well as the continued need to monitor the regime of the
waters through CARU. Id.
114. Id. at 57.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 58.
117. In this regard Uruguay's claim is the mirror opposite of Argentina's. Argentina
previously claimed that the definition of urgency needed to be looked at in the
context of when a decision on the merits would be made since at that time the
plants would be operational and then could cause irreparable harm. On the other
hand, Uruguay is arguing that a decision to suspend construction of the mills
would cause present irreparable harm.
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pended, mainly that the mills would be built in a different country. 118
According to Uruguay, the investors of both plants stated that if the
Court were to grant provisional measures - therefore delaying construc-
tion until a decision on the merits can be reached - it would result in the
investments being moved solely out of business sense. 119 Reicher fin-
ished his argument by pointing to section 41 of the 1975 Statute and stat-
ing that the Court has previously ruled that the Court must look at the
potential irreparable harm done to both countries, not just the one asking
for provisional measures.1 20
4. The Court's Ruling
On July 13, 2006, the ICJ ruled by a fourteen-to-one margin that provi-
sional measures were not appropriate in this case. In so doing, the Court
again showed the very limited circumstances in which provisional mea-
sures will be granted, instead deciding that all issues could be put off until
discussion on the merits. The Court's order began by dividing Argen-
tina's request for provisional measures into sections: one relating to the
actual suspension of the mills and the second relating to cooperation and
"non-aggravation of the dispute.''
First, discussing the procedural rights claimed by Argentina to be vio-
lated, the Court did not find any irreparable harm that demanded provi-
sional measures. Specifically, the Court stated that it "is not at present
convinced that" any procedural violations could not be handled at the
merits stage of the proceedings.' 22 If it later determined that Uruguay
did violate the 1975 Statute, the Court thought it could be remedied at
the merits stage.
The Court then discussed one of the more curious claims by Argen-
tina-the alleged "no construction" obligation contained in the 1975 Stat-
ute. Uruguay had stated during oral hearings that over the thirty years
since the 1975 Statute had been enacted, no country had claimed that
they were allowed the unilateral opportunity to block the other country's
plans until the Court ruled on the dispute. 123 But the Court again de-
ferred deciding the proper interpretation of the 1975 Statute until the
merits phase of the case because it believed "if it should later be shown
that [Argentina's stance] is the correct interpretation of the 1975 Stat-
ute," there is no reason not to believe that it could be remedied at that
time. 124
118. See July Order, supra note 1.
119. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80, at 59.
120. Criminal Proceedings in France (Congo v. Fr.), 2003 I.C.J. 102 (June 17), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/129/8204.pdf. The Court stated in paragraph
22 that "the Court must concern itself with the preservation by such measures of
the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the
Applicant or to the Respondent." Id. (emphasis added).
121. July Order, supra note 1, at 17.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for May Request, supra note 80.
124. July Order, supra note 1, at 18.
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Focusing on the substantive rights, mainly the potential impact on the
environment, the Court noted that Argentina's claims lacked both signs
of imminence and irreparability.1 25 Looking at the record, the Court de-
termined that there was no sign that Uruguay's authorization to construct
the mills "constitutes a present threat of irreparable economic and social
damage" to Argentina or of "damage to the aquatic environment."1 2
6
Switching from irreparability to imminence, the Court noted that no
threat of pollution could be possible until one of the two plants became
operational, years in the future. 127 Obviously, Argentina's definition of
"urgency" was not accepted by the Court.
Before entering its final judgment on the request, the Court stated that
its decision regarding provisional measures in no way implies how the
case will be determined on the merits. This is important, especially when
one looks at the fourteen-to-one margin, because it would appear as
though the Court dismissed Argentina's claims rather easily. But it is
perhaps more a sign of the limiting circumstances in which provisional
measures will be granted. The requirements of irreparable harm and im-
minence are conjunctive, and the Court's final order often found one of
the requirements but not the other. Thus, instead of believing that Uru-
guay is clearly victorious in the dispute concerning the pulp mills, it might
be better to look at the Court's decision with a grain of salt.
VI. ARGENTINE CITIZENS RESPOND
While oral arguments were taking place in front of the ICJ, in Argen-
tina voices were being heard in a much different way. Beginning in 2005
and heating up at the end of 2006, citizens of Gualeguaychti and protes-
ters from a number of environmental groups including Greenpeace began
blocking the bridges leading from Argentina to Uruguay in an attempt to
force the cancellation of the construction of the mills. 128 According to
Uruguay, the goal of the protests was not only to halt construction but to
strike at the heart of the Uruguayan economy by, among other things,
making it more difficult for tourists to cross from Argentina into
Uruguay.
A. TREATY OF AsUNCION
On March 26, 1991, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signed
the Treaty Establishing a Common Market (Treaty of Asuncion). t29 The




128. See Daniel Schweimier, BBC News, River Row Divides Former Friends, Feb. 15,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4716036.stm.
129. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041 [hereinafter
Treaty of Asuncion].
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order to ensure the free-trade goals of the countries are met. 130 For the
settlement of disputes within Mercosur, the Olivos Protocol created an ad
hoc tribunal, empowered to rule on potential violations of the Treaty of
Asuncion. 131 The Treaty of Asuncion calls for "[t]he free movement of
goods, services and factors of production between countries through, in-
ter alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on
the movement of goods, and any other equivalent measures. ''132
B. URUGUAY CLAIMS ARGENTINA VIOLATED TREATY OF AsUNCION
When the blockades continued, Uruguay informed Argentina that they
were going to ask the Mercosur tribunal to rule on whether Argentina
was at fault. The gist of Uruguay's claim was that the blockades pre-
vented what the Treaty of Asuncion was meant to provide: the free circu-
lation of goods between the member states. 133 Uruguay told the
Mercosur tribunal that Argentina was in violation of the Treaty of Asun-
cion because the Argentine government had done little to nothing to end
the blockades. 34 Uruguay, wanting Argentina to account for the situa-
tion and prosecute those blockading the bridges, phrased the issue before
the tribunal as the "[o]mission of the Argentine [sitate to adopt suitable
measures to prevent and/or eliminate the impediments to free circulation
stemming from the blocking of the access roads to international
bridges .... ",135
On September 6, 2006, with the blockades somewhat diminishing, the
three-person tribunal reached a unanimous decision that placed fault par-
tially with Argentina, but not enough to award Uruguay monetary dam-
ages. 136 The tribunal announced that Argentina was at fault for its lack of
due diligence by not attempting to prevent or resolve the road blockades
on its side of the River Uruguay.
This lack of action by Argentina was inconsistent with the Treaty of
Asuncion in that the Treaty of Asuncion required free movement of
goods between countries.' 37 Argentina's claim that preventing its citizens
130. See BBC News, Profile: Mercosur - Common Market of the South, Jan. 29, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5195834.stm.
131. Southern Common Market (Mercosur): The Olivos Protocol, Feb. 18, 2004, 42
I.L.M. 2 (2003).
132. Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 129, at 1045.
133. Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL),
Mercosur: Argentina and Uruguay's Dispute Raised Before Mercosur, http://wwwt.
iadb.org/intal/articulo carta.asp?tid=5&idioma=eng&aid=30&cid=234&cartaid=
166 [hereinafter INTAL Dispute Raised].
134. Mercosur, Tribunal Decision of Sept. 6, 2006, http://200.40.51.219/msweb/SM/esl
Controversias/TPRfTPRTribunal%20AdHocLaudo%20Libre%20Circulacion-
ES.pdf, Spanish text [hereinafter Tribunal Decision]; INTAL, Dispute Between
Argentina and Uruguay: Arbitration Tribunal Award, http://www.iadb.org/intal/ar-
ticulo carta.asp?tid=5&idioma=ENG&aid=132&cid=234&cartaid=289 [hereinaf-
ter INTAL Tribunal Award].
135. Tribunal Decision, supra note 134; see INTAL Tribunal Award, supra note 134.
136. See Tribunal Decision, supra note 134.
137. Id.; Treaty of Asuncion, supra note 129, at 1045.
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from blockading the bridges would be a violation of their human rights -
specifically the right to free speech - was not accepted by the tribunal.
But the tribunal did side with Argentina in the area of intent, ruling that
the Argentine government did not intend to affect trade with Uruguay,
pointing to the fact that Argentina was also affected by the blockades. 138
Finally, on the topic of remedies, the tribunal refused to award Uru-
guay money damages, instead explaining that Mercosur "privileges the
elimination of commercial barriers to trade instead of imposing a second
barrier to trade through retaliation."' 139 At the time the tribunal made a
decision, the blockades had begun to cease, and the tribunal stated that
penalties are looked at prospectively. If the damage was already dimin-
ishing there was no need to penalize Argentina, as long as the country did
not refuse to heed the warning of the tribunal to act diligently. 40
VII. ENCE CANCELS PULP MILL IN URUGUAY
Late in 2006, the Spanish company ENCE cancelled its plans to build
one of the two pulp mills. Although ENCE claimed that the cancellation
had nothing to do with the Argentina's concern and that the company
was still looking to construct a mill in Uruguay, the company's reasoning
to move elsewhere seems faulty. ENCE president Juan Luis Arregui
claimed that the desire to end construction in Fray Bentos was necessary
because it would be impossible for two pulp mills to operate within such a
close proximity. 141
But ENCE had known that the Botnia mill was going to be located
next to it since 2003, yet it never once mentioned the potential problems
two Fray Bentos mills could have. ENCE claimed that problems would
result when both plants were operational and needing to transport fiber
on the same roads. But again, this situation was nothing new to ENCE or
Botnia. There is no reason to think, if such a fear was true, that ENCE
would disregard the possible road traffic until it began construction of the
plant. Further, while the Botnia plant refused to halt construction at the
request of Argentina, ENCE had ceased construction of its mill in March
2006. ENCE might have refused to admit Argentina had anything to do
with the move of the pulp mill, but many with knowledge of the situation
think otherwise. 142
VIII. URUGUAY'S TURN WITH THE ICJ
The cancellation of the ENCE pulp mill did little to quiet the protests
from Argentina. In fact, protesters made sure Uruguay knew that they
138. INTAL, Tribunal Award, supra note 134.
139. Tribunal Decision, supra note 134; See also INTAL, Tribunal Award, supra note
134.
140. Tribunal Decision, supra note 134.




were planning on blocking the International Bridge all summer (approxi-
mately December through February). Because this coincided with the
South American tourist season, Uruguay had finally had enough. On No-
vember 30, 2006, the country submitted a request for provisional mea-
sures to the ICJ.
A. REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES
In its written request to the Court, Uruguay claimed that irreparable
harm and imminent damage would be done by the blockades during the
summer tourist season. 143 The stated purpose of the blockades, Uruguay
wrote, was to prevent the construction and later operation of the Botnia
pulp mill, the exact topic of the litigation before the ICJ.144 But while
that might be the stated goal of the protesters, Uruguay claimed it would
take an enormous economic hit from lost tourists145 and trade dollars. 146
Because of the economic threat imposed by the blockade, Uruguay
claimed that Argentina was attempting to force it to stop the construction
of the Botnia mill or face the loss of millions of dollars. 47
But the Argentine government itself never blockaded the bridges, so
why is Uruguay claiming Argentina is responsible for the potential eco-
nomic impact of the blockades? Uruguay's claim goes back to the
Mercosur tribunal and Argentina's willingness to allow the blockades to
continue. The lack of effort to prevent previous blockades, Uruguay
claimed in its written request for provisional measures, already cost the
country millions of dollars.' 48 Uruguay views Argentina's lack of action
to end the blockades as passive encouragement and implicit agreement
with its citizens.1 49 Viewed in this way, Uruguay claims that Argentina is
exacerbating the situation in violation of the ICJ's July Order regarding
Argentina's own request for provisional measures. 5° The July Order re-
quires that neither party make the case at hand more difficult through
any action or inaction; Uruguay feels Argentina, by its inaction, has vio-
143. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Request for Provisional Mea-
sures) (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/13485.pdf (last visited
Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Uruguay's Written Request].
144. Id. at 2.
145. It is worth pointing out that while Uruguay now claims damages done to its own
tourism industry are worthy of provisional measures, in July, Uruguay claimed that
the ICJ had no jurisdiction regarding any damages outside the River Uruguay.
146. Id. at 2; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru) (Request for Provisional
Measures, Oral Hearings) (Dec. 18, 2006), http://www.icj-cij.org/docketfiles/135/
13529.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Uruguay's First Round of Oral
Hearings for Nov. Request]. Uruguay stated in its written request that the country
could potentially lose hundreds of millions of dollars due to the blockades effect
on tourism and trade. Uruguay's Written Request, supra note 143, at 1.
147. Uruguay's Written Request, supra note 143, at 2.
148. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 146, at 9.
149. Uruguay's Written Request, supra note 143, at 3.
150. Id. at 3; Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 146,
at 10; see also July Order, supra note 1, at 20.
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lated this provision. 151
B. BLOCKADES IN MORE DETAIL
During oral hearings Uruguay described the strategy of the blockades
and why they were successful. After identifying the three bridges one can
take to travel between Argentina and Uruguay, Uruguay focused on the
International Bridge. The International Bridge connects the Argentine
city of Gualeguaychti with Fray Bentos. According to Uruguay, this is
the only bridge that remains blockaded at all times. 152 But, because it
typically is responsible for 91 percent of Uruguay's exports to Argentina,
it is a significant blockade. 53 Additionally, the General San Martin
Bridge is the one relied on by tourists during the summer seasons. As an
example of the havoc caused by the blockades, Professor Boyle described
what it would take to travel from Buenos Aires, Argentina to the Punta
del Este resort in Uruguay: a trip through Brazil. 154
As for imports, Boyle stated that nearly 20 percent of all imports come
from Argentina across one of the three main bridges, and imports from
other nearby countries must also be transported over one of the three
bridges.' 55 Moreover, the reason Uruguay's tourist industry is influenced
so heavily by the blockade is the amazing number of tourists who come to
Uruguay only after they have been to Argentina. According to Boyle, in
2005, almost 58 percent of all tourists visiting Uruguay came from Argen-
tina. 156 In finishing his initial argument before the Court, Boyle made an
important point: Uruguay relies much more on Argentina than Argen-
tina does on Uruguay. 157
After discussing the effect on tourism and trade the blockades may
have, Boyle shifted course and stated that the biggest threat to the Uru-
guayan economy was the potential impact the blockades could have on
the Botnia pulp mill.158 Describing the pulp mill as "the single most im-
portant foreign investment in Uruguay's history," Boyle attempted to
show the Court why the blockades posed such an imminent and irrepara-
151. Uruguay points to five other reasons Argentina should be held responsible for not
ending the blockades: (1) the protesters announced in advance when such block-
ades would take place; (2) although Argentinean law does not allow such block-
ades police activity was limited to ensuring the protests remained peaceful; (3) the
Mercosur tribunal had already scolded Argentina for its lack of action in combat-
ing the problem; (4) prior to the protests in response to the pulp mills Argentina
commonly ended illegal blockades; and (5) Uruguay repeatedly asked Argentina
to lift the blockade. Uruguay's Written Request, supra note 143, at 7.




156. Id. Professor Boyle noted that the Minister of Tourism believed Uruguay would
see 120,000 fewer tourists over the summer season due to the blockades. Id.
157. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 146, at 22-
23.
158. Id. at 23.
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ble harm to Uruguay. 159
C. ARGENTINA'S RESPONSE
1. Jurisdiction
Much like Uruguay argued lack of jurisdiction when Argentina re-
quested provisional measures, Argentina did the same when Uruguay
submitted a request for provisional measures. Specifically, Argentina ar-
gued that the blockades had nothing in common with the case before the
ICJ and therefore jurisdiction was lacking.' 60 Moreover, Argentina
claimed that the only jurisdictional element before the Court was the
1975 Statute, and because the blockades do not encroach on the 1975
Statute, the ICJ should not be able to rule as a matter of law. 161 Continu-
ing with the jurisdictional theme, Argentina argued that if Uruguay is
claiming that the blockades are impeding tourism and trade, those argu-
ments are out place in front of the ICJ since the 1975 Statute does not
cover "freedom of movement," or freedom of commerce or tourism. 162
Additionally, if Uruguay's request for provisional measures is unre-
lated to Uruguay's initial application, the ICJ lacks jurisdiction. 163 The
reason for this is the relationship between a request for provisional mea-
sures and the actual application filed. The application should be viewed
as the main issue in dispute while requests for provisional measures are
disputes related in a significant way to the theme of the application.1 64
As the Court stated, "a request for provisional measures must by its very
nature relate to the substance of the case since ... their object is to pre-
serve the respective rights of either party."' 65 Argentina hoped that the
Court would rule that Uruguay's request for an end to the blockades was
unrelated to the main dispute and therefore dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. 166
2. Uruguay's Inconsistent/Misleading Statements
In front of the Mercosur ad hoc tribunal, Uruguay stated that the
blockades were unrelated to the construction and later operation of the
Botnia pulp mill.167 Uruguay specifically stated to the tribunal that "the
construction of the above-mentioned plants and the possible environmen-
tal considerations related to them have absolutely nothing to do with the
159. Id.
160. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru) (Request for Provisional Measures,
Oral Hearings), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/13539.pdf (last
visited Aug. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Argentina's First Round of Oral Hearings for
Nov. Request].
161. Id. at 3.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 31.
164. Id.
165. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J.
64, (Dec. 15), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/64/6283.pdf.
166. Argentina's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 160, at 3.
167. Id. at 5.
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dispute [concerning the blocking of roads].' 68 This statement is clearly
inconsistent with everything Uruguay said in its first round of oral hear-
ings. 169 In fact, according to Uruguay, the blockading of bridges was a
concerted plan of action intended to force the Botnia mill to move
elsewhere. 170
Argentina also focused on the tourism and trade statistics presented by
Uruguay. As noted above, Uruguay insisted that the blockades were go-
ing to result in decreased tourist income as well as import/export
problems. But Argentina, using numbers from its Secretariat of Tourism,
argued that the numbers indicate the exact opposite of what Uruguay
stated, mainly that tourism is increasing even with the blockades. 17' For
example, Argentina claimed that its statistics showed that the number of
Argentine citizens vacationing in Uruguay had increased 5 percent com-
pared to last year. 172 Argentina further points to a previous meeting of
Uruguayan tour operators in which they claimed that safety was the big-
gest concern in the resort town of Punta del Este, Uruguay, not the block-
ades. 173 As for free trade, Argentina's facts indicated an increase in
Uruguayan exports into Argentina as well as a substantial increase in
sales from Argentina to Uruguay. 74
3. Blockades' Effect on the Construction of the Botnia Pulp Mill
Uruguay stated in the first round of oral hearings that its gravest con-
cern was the potential effect of the blockades on the lone remaining pulp
mill being constructed in Fray Bentos. 175 To show the potential adverse
impact that the blockades can possibly have on the Botnia pulp mill, Uru-
guay pointed to the move of the ENCE mill as proof of the power of the
blockades. 76 But ENCE announced at the headquarters of the Presi-
dency of Uruguay that the move had nothing to do with the blockades or
protests from Argentina. 177
If ENCE did not move because of the blockades, the only possible way
for Uruguay to receive provisional measures would be to show that the
construction of the Botnia mill was adversely affected by the road blocks.
After all, Argentina's request months prior for its own provisional mea-
sures showed how difficult it was to show imminence and irreparable
harm, and Uruguay faced the same difficult test. Only if the blockades
168. Id.; see Tribunal Decision, supra note 134.
169. See Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 146.
170. See id.
171. Argentina's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 160, at 5.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 6. The exact numbers show an increase in exports from Uruguay into Argen-
tina of 17 percent while the number of imports from Argentina into Uruguay is up
50 percent over the same period of time. Id.
175. Uruguay's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 146, at 23.
176. Id. at 27.
177. Argentina's First Round of Oral Hearings for Nov. Request, supra note 160, at 7;
see Chris Lang, supra note 141.
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were actually affecting the construction of the pulp mill could Uruguay
claim that its biggest foreign investment was in trouble. But Argentina
was well aware of this and addressed the Court concerning the constant
progress in the construction of the Botnia mill.
Argentina submitted its application in July, nearly five months prior to
when Uruguay requested provisional measures. 178 In July, the Botnia
plant was at approximately 25 percent completion, while five months
later it stood nearly 70 percent complete. 179 Over five months the plant
completed nearly half of its construction, but Uruguay still claimed the
blockades in Argentina threatened the entire operation. °8 0 Argentina
said this repeatedly to the Court during oral hearings, stating that the
pace of the construction has not slowed down and perhaps it has only
increased.' 8 ' Therefore, Argentina argued, it was impossible that the
blockades were having any affect on the progress of the mills, and cer-
tainly not enough influence to warrant provisional measures. 18
2
4. Court Rules on Uruguay's Request
By the same margin as it ruled months earlier, the ICJ voted fourteen-
to-one in favor of rejecting the country's request for provisional mea-
sures. 18 3 But the Court did find that it had jurisdiction, announcing fairly
broadly that anything having to do with the construction or commission
of the Botnia mill was related to Argentina's application and therefore
fair grounds for provisional measures.' 84 Further, the Court stated that
the issues raised before the Mercosur tribunal were different than the
ones raised in Uruguay's request before the ICJ. 185
If the Court were to grant provisional measures they would result from
Argentina violating the July Order and exacerbating the situation. But
the requirements of irreparability and imminence loomed large, and in
the end were the reason the Court ruled as it did. Uruguay's substantive
request before the Court was for Argentina to at least attempt to put an
end to the roadblocks. The Court found, as Argentina had proven ear-
lier, that even with the blockades in place, the construction of the Botnia
mill had continued.18 6
It is difficult for Uruguay to argue - much less prove - that its right to
continue construction unimpeded are imminently in danger of being ir-
reparably harmed when at no time has the construction process slowed
178. See Argentina Application, supra note 2; Uruguay's Written Request, supra note
143.




183. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.) (Order of Jan. 23, 2007), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/13615.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2008)
[hereinafter January Order].
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for a moment. Interestingly, but perhaps not unexpectedly, the Court re-
fused to answer whether the blockades had any effect on the construction
process, instead stating the requirements for provisional measures were
not met. 187 The Court admitted that it had in previous times granted pro-
visional measures "directing the parties not to take any actions which
could aggravate or extend the dispute or render more difficult its settle-
ment" but that in this case provisional measures were not necessary for
such a reason. 188 The Court seemed to imply in its order that, when such
measures were given, they were required to prevent the situation from
escalating into one that would lead to irreparable harm. Here that con-
cern was lacking.
IX. PRESENT ANALYSIS
Much has happened since the Court ruled on Uruguay's request for
provisional measures. First, the ENCE pulp mill announced that it would
indeed build its mill in Uruguay, but at a site south of Fray Bentos.' 89
The announcement was made by ENCE president Juan Luis Arregui (in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, of all places). At the time of announcement
Argentina expressed its thanks to ENCE for its attitude during the entire
process, a sign that there was more to ENCE's move from Fray Bentos
than just road traffic. But Arregui did make one statement that did not
sit well with Argentine citizens: "Personally I don't believe Botnia will
pollute at all."'190
Second, as expected, the Botnia pulp mill was completed and, on No-
vember 9, 2007, produced its first load of pulp.' 9 ' More than 20,000 Ar-
gentine citizens protested the historic day that had been postponed since
September.1 92 The fact that the mill became operational prior to the
ICJ's ruling on the merits is important. It is hard to imagine the ICJ
forcing the closure of an already operational mill for any reason other
than environmental issues. But, the fact that the mill is operational also
gives the Court, and Argentina and Uruguay, a chance to see whether or
not the pollutant levels rise over the coming months. Additionally, the
South American tourist season is winding up, and the Court will have a
better idea as to the mill's affect on tourism in the coming months.
One thing that has not changed is the harsh sentiment between Argen-
tina and Uruguay. Hopes were high that the two countries could rekindle
what was once an important and beneficial relationship when Christina
187. See id. at 10.
188. Id. at 12.
189. Spain's ENCE Announces new Uruguay Plant Location, REUTERS ALERTNET,
Dec. 13, 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdeskN12379753.htm.
190. Id.
191. Botnia Starts up Controversial Pulp Mill in Uruguay, GLOBAL UNION, Nov. 11,
2007, http://www.union-network.org/unigraphical.nsf/0/53BFEA789E91F109C125
73930037284B.
192. First Load of Wood Pulp Leaves Uruguay's Botnia Plant, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Nov. 15, 2007, http:l/www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/15/americalLA-GEN-Uru-
guay-Paper-Plant-Feud.php?WT.mc-id=rssap-news.
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Kirchner was elected Argentina's president in October 2007. She was
replacing her husband, whom most people thought had a more aggressive
foreign policy than she did, and some expected Kirchner immediately to
reach out to Uruguay.193 Instead, Kirchner used her inauguration speech
to mention how Uruguay violated the 1975 Statute; this in front of Uru-
guayan president Tabare Vazquez, who was there for the celebration. 194
It will likely be more than a year until the ICJ returns with a decision
on the merits. By that time the Botnia mill will have been in operation
for at least twelve months, but more likely closer to sixteen. At that point
enough time will have passed to at least preliminarily determine whether
the mill will run as efficiently and as environmentally friendly as stated.
But the larger and more difficult question is how the Court will react if it
finds Uruguay violated Argentina's procedural rights. It is irrational for
Argentina to expect the Court to order Uruguay to shut down the Botnia
plant for a procedural violation; this will only happen if harm is being
done to the environment. Instead, the more likely scenario would be for
Argentina to recover a monetary award from Uruguay. But Argentina
was not after money. It wanted its citizens free from concerns that their
water will be polluted or that the fish they catch will be full of toxins.
Unfortunately for Argentina, unless there are early signs of pollution,
that guarantee seems unlikely.
193. See Celia Szusterman, Pulp Friction: The Argentina-Uruguay Conflict, OPEN DE-
MOCRACY, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/globalisation/
the-great-dividethe-argentinauruguay-pulp-mill-conflict.
194. Vazquez later cancelled a dinner scheduled with Kirchner over the remarks men-
tioned, as well as remarks made days later.
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